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OVERVIEW — Medicare Advantage special needs plans (SNPs) are a
new type of coordinated care plan established by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act. SNPs were created to
encourage greater access to Medicare managed care for certain special
needs populations: the institutionalized, persons dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid, and the chronically ill. Some view SNPs as a new
opportunity to integrate acute and long-term care services as well as
Medicare and Medicaid financing. Others, however, question the degree
to which full integration will become a widespread reality. This issue brief
examines the SNP option and the promises and challenges it presents for
better coordinated care.
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Specialized Medicare Advantage (MA) plans for special needs individuals—known as special needs plans (SNPs)—are a new type of managed
care plan established by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement
and Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003. Congress included the statutory provision authorizing SNPs as part of its effort to increase both
plan and beneficiary participation in Medicare managed care. Created
to encourage more opportunities for special needs individuals to access
managed care, the SNP option allows MA plans to specialize in care for
beneficiaries who are residing in long-term care facilities, dually
eligible for Medicare and Medicaid, or chronically ill. With the SNP designation, plans may limit enrollment to one of the special needs populations, tailoring benefits and provider networks to best meet the needs
of these vulnerable groups.
In addition to expanding Medicare managed care choices for special needs
individuals, some view SNPs as a new opportunity to integrate Medicare
and Medicaid. Coordination of acute and long-term care services through
managed care for high-cost, high-need populations—particularly dual
eligibles (low-income Medicare beneficiaries also eligible for Medicaid)—
has been an interest of state and federal policymakers for many years.
Federal and state experiments to deliver a continuum of acute and longterm care services under a capitated payment structure date back to the
1970s. Since then, congressionally authorized demonstration programs
and state waiver demonstrations have explored a variety of managed care
and fee-for-service (FFS) approaches to coordinating and even integrating Medicare and Medicaid financing, case management, and service
delivery. In this context, SNPs may be viewed as another step toward
integration because they encourage access to managed care for special
needs individuals without the requirement for a Medicaid waiver or a
demonstration from Medicare.
However, many believe the opportunity for integrated acute and longterm care services will not become a widespread reality. SNPs are, first
and foremost, Medicare Advantage plans, subject to the same rules and
requirements as other MA plans, including a new risk-adjusted payment
methodology that was included in the MMA. SNPs are not required to
have contracts with state Medicaid programs; they can focus on the delivery of Medicare services and rely on fee-for-service Medicaid to “wrap
around” their benefit package for dual eligible enrollees. In addition, not
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all states will be interested in working with SNPs. A state’s interest in
coordinating and contracting with SNPs will likely depend on its previous experience with managed care, particularly for elderly and disabled
populations. Finally, full integration of the two programs will require that
SNPs interested in serving dual eligibles be willing and able to meet the
inconsistent Medicare and Medicaid requirements regarding marketing,
enrollment, operations, reimbursement, and quality assurance. These operational challenges are likely to keep some SNPs from pursuing participation in both programs.
Interest in SNPs is high. In 2006, 276 SNPs will serve Medicare beneficiaries, and the majority of approved plans will serve dual eligible beneficiaries. Some are Medicaid managed care plans seeking to enter the
Medicare market. In many respects these plans, with their state contracts and experience serving special needs individuals such as dual
eligibles, represent the “ideal” SNP. However, many approved SNPs do not have contracts with state Medicaid In 2006, 276 SNPs will serve
agencies and are new to serving special needs individuals. Medicare beneficiaries, and the
Although it is clear that the new SNP option will generate
different models for treating special needs individuals, it is majority of approved plans will
not known whether fully integrated care will result.
serve dual eligibles.
To better understand this new opportunity under Medicare managed care,
this issue brief explores the new SNP option and the promises and challenges policymakers face in their efforts to coordinate Medicare and Medicaid services. It also examines the financial incentives that are driving
the SNP market.

SNAPSHOT OF DUAL ELIGIBLES
Although the Medicare program serves an important purpose in providing health insurance coverage, it was not designed as a comprehensive
benefit and therefore does not meet the full range of health needs of the
nation’s elderly and disabled populations. Medicare covers hospital care
and skilled nursing facility care, but the benefits are time-limited. The program also covers physician visits, hospice care, home health care, diagnostic tests, durable medical equipment, and some, but not all, primary and
preventive care. Medicare will offer prescription drug coverage beginning
in 2006. Beneficiaries are liable for premiums, deductibles, coinsurance,
and copayments that can be quite substantial, especially for individuals
with chronic or acute health care needs. As a result, many individuals who
have lower incomes and/or high-cost medical needs eventually qualify to
have Medicaid cover the costs of care that Medicare does not.1 These individuals are known as “dual eligibles.”
The vast majority of approved SNPs will serve dual eligibles. The approximately 7 million people who are dually eligible for Medicare and
Medicaid have low incomes and are aged, blind, or disabled. Six million
are considered to be “full benefit” dual eligibles, meaning they qualify
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for full Medicaid benefits. Another 1 million individuals are considered
“partial benefit” dual eligibles, as they receive assistance with Medicare cost sharing only. Partial benefit dual eligibles are enrolled through
three Medicaid eligibility categories: qualified Medicare beneficiaries
(QMBs), specified low-income Medicare beneficiaries (SLMBs), or qualifying individuals (QIs). These are also known as “Medicare Savings
Program (MSP)” eligibility groups. The term “dual eligible” encompasses all of these individuals (Table 1).2
Dual eligibles may have complex and costly medical needs. Nursing home
residents, many of whom are or become dually eligible, take on average
more than six routine prescription drugs per day, and nearly 75 percent
have cognitive impairments.3 Chronic conditions [for example congestive heart failure, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), HIV/
AIDS, and end-stage renal disease] account for 78 percent of the nation’s
total medical care costs and almost 80 percent of Medicaid expenditures.4
Dual eligibles account for a small share of Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries (14 percent of Medicaid beneficiaries and 17 percent of Medicare beneficiaries) but a much higher share of program spending (40
percent for Medicaid, 24 percent for Medicare).5 In comparison to the
general Medicare population, dual eligibles have lower incomes, more
chronic illnesses, and higher medical costs, and they are more likely to
be in nursing facilities. Dual eligibles are three times more likely to be
disabled than the nondual eligible population. One-third of all dual eligibles have difficulty completing three to six activities of daily living (for
example, bathing, dressing, feeding). Almost one-quarter of dual eligibles

TABLE 1
Categories of Dual Eligibles
ELIGIBILITY

MEDICAID BENEFIT

TYPE OF DUAL ELIGIBLE

(Income Limit)

(What Medicaid Covers)

Full Benefit

Less than or
equal to
73% FPL*

Full Medicaid benefits
plus Medicare Part B premium
and cost sharing

Qualified Medicare
Beneficiary (QMB)

Up to 100% FPL

Medicare Part B premium
and cost sharing

Specified Low-Income
Medicare Beneficiary (SLMB)

Between 100%
and 120% FPL

Medicare Part B premium only

Qualifying Individual (QI)

Between 120%
and 135% FPL

Medicare Part B premium only

* States set their own Medicaid eligibility levels, usually at or below the supplemental security income
(SSI) eligibility level of 73 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL). Some states have extended full
Medicaid benefits to elderly and disabled beneficiaries with incomes up to 100 percent of the FPL
($9,570 per year for an individual or $12,830 per year for a couple in 2005).
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reside in an institution, compared with 3 percent of nondual eligibles.6 Dual
eligibles also are more likely to have multiple chronic conditions such as
heart disease, diabetes, and mental and cognitive impairments.7
Dual eligibles cost Medicare 60 percent more than nondual eligibles (Table
2).8 Total annual spending across all payers for dual eligibles averaged about
$20,840 per person in 2001, more than twice the amount for other Medicare
beneficiaries. Because their health needs vary, dual eligibles are not equally
costly. In 2001, the costliest 5
percent of dual eligibles acTABLE 2
counted for over 40 percent of
Comparison of Costs:
total Medicare spending for
Nondual Eligibles versus
this population. The least
Dual Eligibles
costly 50 percent of dual eligible beneficiaries accounted
for only 3 percent of Medicare
Source
Nondual
Dual
spending on dual eligibles.9
Medicare
$ 5,399
$ 8,559
State spending on dual eliMedicaid
85*
8,603
gibles varies widely and is
driven by Medicaid benefit
Other
4,570
3,682
packages and the number
and type of dual eligibles in
the state’s population. The
TOTAL
$ 10,054 $ 20,844
number of dual eligibles
varies across states due to
Note: Total spending includes Medicare, Medicaid, and outdifferent Medicaid eligibility
of-pocket spending in addition to spending from other
criteria as well as demosources of supplemental insurance and public programs
(for example, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Degraphics. For example, dual
partment of Defense).
eligibles represent 7 percent
* Some nonduals have Medicaid coverage for some
of all Medicaid beneficiaries
portion of the year.
in Alaska and Idaho, comSource: MedPAC analysis of Cost and Use file, 2001
pared with 25 percent in KenMedicare Current Beneficiary Survey, in MedPAC, New
tucky.10 In Nevada, Medicaid
Approaches to Medicare, June 2004.
spent approximately $7,232
per dual eligible in 2002, whereas Medicaid spending per dual eligible
beneficiary in Connecticut was approximately $27,000.11 Long-term care
services account for the majority of state spending on dual eligibles
(Figure 1, see next page).

BARRIERS TO SUCCESSFUL CARE COORDINATION
Many will argue there is a systematic lack of coordination among primary,
acute, and long-term care providers, in part because our health care system
focuses on meeting specific service needs without addressing the interaction of acute and chronic needs. This lack of coordination can be particularly detrimental for the populations SNPs are designed to serve.
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Compared with other Medicare
beneficiaries, these individuals generally need more care among a
broader range of providers in order
to prevent the onset of disease or the
progression of disabling conditions.

FIGURE 1
State Spending on Dual Eligibles, 2002

Long-Term Care (65%)
Case management is one approach
Medicare
to coordinating health services.
Covered
However, a more comprehensive
Services (6%)
approach is for plans to integrate
care and cover the full range of acute
Medicare
Premiums (11%)
and long-term care services. The
SNP option presents an opportunity
Other
Prescribed
Acute (4%)
Drugs (14%)
for the managed care market to explore integrated care plans under
Source: Jennifer Bryant, Lisa Chimento, Melissa Rowan, “Business Opportunities in the Medicare
Medicare. Furthermore, SNPs, if
Modernization Act for Community Affiliated Health Plans,” The Lewin Group, April 15, 2004.
contracting with state Medicaid
programs, may be able to address concerns about the inconsistencies between the two programs, which have created significant challenges for
this particularly vulnerable population.
Inconsistent financing mechanisms, separate management structures,
and somewhat different fundamental program objectives between Medicare and Medicaid can lead to fragmented care and a lack of accountability for health outcomes. Currently, dual eligibles may receive services
from FFS or managed care in either program, and it is possible to be in
FFS for one program and managed care for the other, or even be enrolled
in two different managed care programs simultaneously. This fragmentation of delivery systems does not facilitate, and may even hinder, access to and coordination of care.
Because dual eligibles need a wider range of services, coordination and
communication can be especially challenging. In certain instances, dual
eligible beneficiaries may need to see different providers for certain
program-specific benefits. For example, Medicaid covers a full range of
mental health services that Medicare does not, which could result in an
individual having to change providers when the Medicare benefit runs out.
Beneficiaries face the challenge of working between two different benefit
packages in order to attain the full range of needed services. Limited or no
communication between providers is all too common. For example, primary care physicians or specialists are sometimes unaware when their
patients are admitted to nursing facilities, and Medicaid home care case
managers might not be informed when their clients are hospitalized.
Many believe that enrolling dual eligibles in managed care will improve
care coordination and health outcomes, but experience to date has been
limited. Most dual eligibles are enrolled in FFS options in both programs.
Many states have utilized mandatory managed care for children and
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families, but only a small number of elderly and Since the early 1970s, policymakers have
disabled dual eligibles are enrolled in Medicaid managed care and most have enrolled vol- been exploring ways to create incentives
untarily. Further, long-term care services are for managed care plans to integrate acute
usually carved out of managed care options. Beand long-term care services.
cause Medicaid pays for services not covered
by Medicare without any cost to the beneficiary, the incentive for dual eligibles to enroll in Medicare managed care plans is reduced. Currently, 18
percent of noninstitutionalized dual eligibles are enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans.12 About 10 percent of dual eligibles are enrolled in Medicaid
managed care, and this enrollment is concentrated in a handful of states.

EFFORTS TOWARD INTEGRATED CARE
Since the early 1970s, policymakers have been exploring ways to create
incentives for managed care plans to integrate acute and long-term care
services, providing the full continuum of care. Assuming a per-beneficiary
payment is an inherent incentive to provide the most appropriate care in
the most cost-effective setting,13 a variety of state demonstrations with various degrees of acute care and long-term care coordination and MedicareMedicaid integration have been implemented. In addition to cost
savings, these demonstrations attempt to address the fragmentation in
delivery systems, ensure access to primary and preventive care, improve
accountability for health outcomes, provide incentives for the appropriate use of medical services, and reduce administrative differences between
Medicare and Medicaid.14
The demonstrations vary with regard to specific populations served, the services provided, and the approach to care coordination and program integration. Early demonstrations under the Program of All-Inclusive Care for the
Elderly (PACE) and Evercare Choice are provider-initiated programs.
■

PACE replicates the delivery system pioneered by On Lok SeniorHealth
Services, an adult day care center that integrated health and social
services in the San Francisco area. Initially authorized as a demonstration in 1986, PACE is now a permanent Medicare and Medicaid
service delivery model that was specifically authorized in the Medicare and Medicaid statutes in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. The
primary goal of the PACE model is to help frail elderly individuals
remain in the community through intensive care management. PACE
enrollees are predominantly dual eligibles (96 percent), have seven to
eight medical diagnoses, and exhibit some degree of dementia or other
cognitive impairment. PACE sites resemble small, staff-model HMOs—
with interdisciplinary teams that include physicians, nurses, social
workers, case managers, physical therapists, and occupational therapists—designed with the goal of treating “the whole person.” Most
PACE sites serve fewer than 200 enrollees, and PACE enrollees can only
see PACE providers. There are currently 31 PACE sites operating in 18
states. PACE programs served more than 6,500 frail elderly in 2000.15
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■

Evercare Choice began in 1987 as a Medicare demonstration and builds
on the PACE model, providing case management services for nursing
home residents to reduce the need for hospital and emergency room
care. Evercare assigns physicians and geriatric nurse practitioners to
nursing home residents to provide coordinated primary care. Evaluations of Evercare show that quality of care and health outcomes have
improved and hospitalizations have decreased. Evercare has since
expanded its service delivery model to serve dual eligibles through
community-based managed care plans. In fact, most current Evercare
enrollees reside in the community. Evercare began operating as an
institutional SNP in 2005.

Seeing opportunities to improve continuity of care, provide nontraditional
benefits, and coordinate systems of care with interdisciplinary teams, states
have attempted to expand the scope of the earlier demonstrations with
their own state-specific waiver programs.16 Federal law requires states to
seek waivers of certain Medicare and Medicaid requirements in their efforts to integrate care. Section 222(b) of the Social Security Act Amendments of 1972 provides authority for demonstrations that experiment with Medicare payment States have attempted to expand the
methodologies, and section 1115 of the Social scope of the earlier demonstrations with
Security Act authorizes demonstrations for Medtheir own state-specific waiver programs.
icaid program innovations. Federal policy requires that demonstrations be budget neutral, meaning that the expenditures under the waiver must be no higher than they would be without
the waiver. States also seek waivers of section 1915 of the Social Security
Act for certain Medicaid managed care acute and long-term care integration programs. Waivers of section 1915(b) permit states to mandate
enrollment in managed care settings, whereas waivers of section 1915(c)
permit states to place beneficiaries needing the institutional level of care in
home and community-based care settings. In some instances, states have
pursued combination 1915(b) and (c) waivers to coordinate home and community-based care under capitated payment arrangements.
■

Minnesota Senior Health Options (MSHO) integrates acute and
long-term care services and Medicare and Medicaid financing in a
managed care setting. Using section 1115 and section 222 waiver authority, MSHO enrolls the full range of dual eligibles, including those
who are healthy, institutionalized, or frail but living in the community.17 Minnesota is the only state to have such a program, in part
because it limits a Medicare beneficiary’s choice of providers, an
extremely controversial feature. Its sister program, Minnesota Disability Health Options (MnDHO) provides managed care services to
individuals with disabilities. MSHO and MnDHO integrate Medicare and Medicaid financing and service delivery. Enrollees are assigned
a care coordinator who is involved in all aspects of their care from scheduling primary care visits to arranging home and community-based care.
MSHO is converting to a SNP.
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■

Texas STAR+PLUS is a Medicaid waiver program that provides acute
and long-term care services on a capitated basis. Program officials originally planned on a fully integrated mandatory program that included
Medicare services and providers but learned that the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) would not grant a combined
Medicaid-Medicare waiver for an integrated care program. As a result,
the program integrates Medicaid services only, through 1915(b) and
1915(c) waivers. Enrollees have the choice of three managed care organizations, including one that provides both Medicare and Medicaid
benefits. Enrollees choosing the same plan for Medicaid and Medicare
services receive an enhanced prescription drug benefit. Texas
STAR+PLUS is also converting to a SNP.

■

The Wisconsin Partnership Program operates under Medicaid section 1115 and Medicare section 222 waiver authority, combining benefits of both under one program. Through community providers, the
program serves elderly individuals who require a nursing home level of care. The demonstration also includes The SNP option may be the logia comprehensive managed care plan for individuals cal next step toward integrated
aged 18 to 65 with physical disabilities at risk of nursacute and long-term care services
ing home placement who are covered by Medicaid only
in managed care settings.
or are dual eligibles.

Many states find the complexity of planning and implementing a demonstration and the extended times for the federal review process to be too
great. Some states, like Texas, end up curtailing efforts for MedicareMedicaid integration and focus instead on the integration of acute and
long-term care services under Medicaid. In addition federal rules require
the renewal of existing demonstrations, such as Evercare, every two years.
These and other factors led to a lobbying effort for a permanent option
under Medicare to create and market plans designed specifically to facilitate serving special needs individuals.

ANOTHER STEP TOWARD INTEGRATED CARE?
With the current integrated care demonstrations serving as prototypes,
the SNP option may be the logical next step toward integrated acute and
long-term care services in managed care settings. CMS comments in the
final regulations governing SNPs that the plans are “primarily intended
to encourage more choices for certain populations by allowing organizations that specialize in the treatment of beneficiaries with particular needs
to have Medicare Advantage (MA) contracts.” CMS further states that
this provision could “encourage organizations to develop new products
in the marketplace by giving them the opportunity to develop expertise
in efficiently serving special needs populations.”18 Actual integration of
care, however, will depend on the SNP’s choice of service delivery approach, states’ willingness to work with SNPs, and the effectiveness of
marketing efforts in generating beneficiary interest. The ideal service
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delivery approach is a “dually capitated” managed care plan that would
receive payments from both Medicare and Medicaid. However, the more
likely scenario will be that Medicare managed care plans will focus their
efforts on delivering Medicare services and rely on Medicaid fee-forservice to provide wraparound benefits.

SNP Authority and Regulations
Section 231 of MMA (P.L. 108-173) authorizes “specialized MA plans for
special needs individuals” defined as “MA plans that exclusively serve
special needs individuals.” The law briefly defines a special needs individual as an “MA eligible individual who is institutionalized (as defined
by the Secretary); is entitled to medical assistance under XIX; or meets
such requirements as the Secretary may determine would benefit from
enrollment in such a specialized MA plan…for individuals with severe
or disabling chronic conditions.”19 Other provisions in the law include a
sunset provision of January 1, 2009 for SNPs [section 231(c)] and a mandated report to Congress that “assesses the impact of specialized MA plans
for special needs individuals on the cost and quality of services provided
to enrollees” by December 31, 2007 [section 231(e)]. The SNP provisions
were effective on the date of enactment of the MMA.
The final regulations (codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, part
42, section 422) and additional operational guidance from CMS provide
more details regarding the SNP target populations.
■

“Institutionalized” is defined in section 422.2 as “an MA eligible individual who continuously resides or is expected to continuously reside for 90 days or longer in a long-term care facility which is a skilled
nursing facility (SNF), nursing facility (NF), SNF/NF, an intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded (ICF/MR), or an inpatient
psychiatric facility.” CMS further states in its final regulation that it
will “consider as institutionalized those individuals living in the community but requiring a level-of-care equivalent to that of those individuals in the aforementioned long-term care facilities.”

■

“Severe or disabling chronic condition beneficiaries” are not defined in the regulation. CMS was concerned that a detailed definition would limit the availability of SNPs and wanted to provide as
much flexibility as the law allowed for this new untested type of MA
plan. Section 422.2 states that CMS will review and evaluate proposals for specialized MA plans that serve severe or disabling chronic
conditions “on a case-by-case basis using criteria that include
the appropriateness of the target population, the existence of clinical programs or special expertise to serve the target population, and
whether the proposal discriminates against ‘sicker’ members of the
target population.” Single or multiple health criteria can be used to
define enrollment.
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Proposals to serve subsets of SNP populations will be considered by CMS.
In its guidance, CMS states that it will “consider requests for SNPs that
serve certain subsets of dual eligibles and institutionalized individuals
based on common characteristics such as a specific network of facilities
and Medicaid eligibility (e.g., full benefit duals only) on a case-by-case
basis.” It is important to note that SNPs cannot serve
QMBs or SLMBs exclusively. This provision is designed One of the driving forces behind
to keep plans from “cherry picking” these healthier seg- managed care organizations’ interments of the dual eligible population.

est in SNPs is the new risk-adjusted
for MA plans.

CMS guidance states that managed care organizations
payment formula
with existing MA plans that serve defined special needs
individuals may apply to have their plan “redesignated” as an MA SNP.
Organizations that do not have an MA contract (for example, a Medicaid
managed care plan) and want to offer an MA SNP must first apply for an
MA contract and meet the requirements of an MA plan before they can
receive the SNP designation.
The rest of the regulatory requirements regarding SNP operations are not
unique to SNPs because SNPs are MA plans. SNPs are subject to the same
rules and requirements, such as enrollment, quality criteria, marketing,
and payment methodology, as all other MA plans.

The Plan Perspective
SNP application activity has exceeded expectations; 125 plans were approved for operation in 2005. These are predominantly managed care plans
that already have MA contracts with CMS. An additional 151 new SNPs
have been approved for 2006, bringing the total number of SNPs serving
Medicare beneficiaries in 2006 to 276. The 2006 plans include Medicaid
managed care plans looking to become MA SNP plans.
Not surprisingly, over 80 percent of SNPs—226 of the 276 approved
plans—will serve the dual eligible population (thus called “dual eligible
SNPs”). CMS has approved 37 institutional SNPs, and 13 plans will serve
beneficiaries with chronic conditions.20 A number of approved plans are
already serving SNP target populations, but many others will be new to
providing services to these groups.
One of the driving forces behind managed care organizations’ interest
in SNPs were the new risk-adjusted payment formula for MA plans.
Low payment rates was one of the main reasons cited for plans leaving
or never participating in Medicare+Choice (the predecessor to Medicare
Advantage) in the late 1990s and early 2000s. To generate plan interest in
Medicare managed care, the MMA included several changes to payment
rates for plans, including immediate payment increases for 2004 and 2005.
Further, payments will be adjusted for the expected costs of the enrollees,
based on their health status rather than demographic factors, as was the
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case previously. In 2006, 75 percent of the payment will be adjusted by
health status, the rest by demographic factors. By 2007, the payment will
be entirely adjusted by health status.
This risk-adjustment formula translates into higher payments on behalf
of enrollees with the most costly health conditions. The formula will also
include additional payments—8 percent for dual eligibles, 8 percent for
long-term institutionalized elderly, and 21 percent for long-term institutionalized disabled—as part of the risk-adjusted MA paySNPs enrolling larger numbers of
ment rate for Medicare beneficiaries.21 Concerns have been
raised that this formula may lead to overpayment for plans MSP beneficiaries may enjoy
with relatively healthy dual eligible enrollees.
greater financial gains.
CMS pays MA plans the additional 8 percent for all dual eligibles, regardless of whether they are full benefit duals with incomes below the
federal poverty level or partial benefit dual eligibles—QMBs, SLMBs, or
QIs—with higher incomes. These MSP enrollees are generally healthier
and less costly than full benefit dual eligibles. Therefore, plans enrolling
larger numbers of MSP beneficiaries may enjoy greater financial gains. In
fact, marketplace analysts say that this enrollment strategy is the key to
the bottom line of SNPs. According to the Gorman Health Group, QMB,
SLMB, and full benefit dual beneficiaries are historically associated with
10 percent higher costs than the average Medicare beneficiary but result
in 25 to 35 percent higher payments to plans. They also assert that the
financial benefits of enrolling this population will continue to improve as
risk adjustment is fully implemented.22
Many more Medicare beneficiaries are eligible for some form of Medicaid
assistance than are currently enrolled. The Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission (MedPAC) reports that, of those who are eligible, only 16
percent of SLMBs and between 55 and 75 percent of QMBs are enrolled.23
Starting in 2006, states will be required to screen Medicare beneficiaries for
participation in MSPs during eligibility screening for subsidies related to
the Medicare drug benefit. CMS anticipates that another 13 percent of Medicare beneficiaries are eligible for MSPs but are not enrolled. The agency has
predicted that screening efforts could result in enrollment of millions of
additional partial benefit dual eligibles. Given the financial incentive, SNPs
are likely to design marketing efforts to encourage enrollment of this
healthier segment of the dual eligible population.

The Beneficiary Perspective
Moving beneficiaries from traditional FFS Medicare into SNPs may be challenging. Medicare beneficiaries are motivated to join MA plans to reduce
out-of-pocket costs, such as premiums and cost sharing, and to have access
to supplemental benefits not covered by traditional Medicare. For example,
many MA plans replace the 20 percent copayment rate for physician visits
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under traditional Medicare with a flat $10 copayment per visit, and they
include coverage for services omitted from traditional Medicare, such as
vision and dental services. Despite these incentives, however, only 13 percent of the overall Medicare population is enrolled in managed care.
The incentive for dual eligible beneficiaries to join MA plans is not as
strong as for other beneficiaries and varies by type of eligibility. Medicaid pays Medicare premiums and cost sharing for dual eligibles and also
provides wraparound coverage for services Medicare does not cover, such
as prescription drugs, long-term care, vision, and dental services. So the
dual eligible beneficiary does not currently stand to gain a great deal from
joining an MA plan unless the plan can offer the beneficiary something
he or she currently is not getting under the two separate programs. In
addition, many seniors have a generally negative impression of managed
care, in part because of the perception that they will have to change doctors and go to new locations to access their care.
Medicare managed care enrollment of dual eligibles varies by category
(Table 3). In 2005, only 14.5 percent of full benefit dual eligibles enrolled
in an MA plan, but nearly one in every four SLMB eligibles24 selected an
MA plan. Like full benefit dual eligibles, SLMBs have the Medicare Part
B premium paid by Medicaid; however, unlike full benefit dual eligibles,
SLMBs must pay Medicare copayments, deductibles, and coinsurance
out of pocket. Research has shown the level of MA plan payment affects
enrollment of dual eligibles, with higher MA payment rates leading to
higher enrollment among low-income Medicare beneficiaries.25 MA plans
receiving higher payments are more likely to offer supplemental benefits and reduce cost-sharing and/or premium requirements, making
those plans more desirable and more affordable to beneficiaries than
FFS Medicare. Analysts have estimated that a $10 increase in MA payment reduces the probability that a dually eligible individual will remain in Medicare FFS by 11 percent.26

TABLE 3
Medicare Advantage
Enrollment of Dual Eligibles,*
by Type of Eligibility
TYPE OF
DUAL ELIGIBLE

PERCENT
ENROLLED

Full Benefit

14.5%

QMBs

15.8%

SLMBs

23.8%

* Includes only noninstitutionalized, ageeligible beneficiaries.
Source: 2001 MCBS Cost and Use File updated with 2005 enrollment figures, as cited
in Adam Atherly and Kenneth Thorpe, “Value
of Medicare Advantage to Low-Income and
Minority Medicare Beneficiaries,” Emory
University, September 20, 2005, 7.

The State Perspective
Medicare SNPs can create opportunities for states that wish to enhance
and better coordinate care. A variety of factors, most importantly state
experience with managed care for the elderly and disabled, will affect
states’ decisions whether to work with SNPs.
SNPs interested in coordinating with Medicaid programs provide states
an opportunity to make managed care more attractive to dual eligibles.
States have fewer dual eligibles in managed care than other populations:
only 10 percent of the dual eligibles were enrolled in Medicaid managed
care in 2002,27 compared to nearly 60 percent of the overall Medicaid population.28 Obstacles to implementing managed care programs for dual eligible populations include the inability to manage the Medicare portion of
the benefit and concerns about the ability to limit Medicare beneficiaries’
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freedom of choice of providers. Through SNPs and their networks of
providers, issues of fragmentation, chronic care management for frail
populations, and capitated payments for long-term care services can be
addressed. Working with dual eligible SNPs might also help states avoid
“pay and chase” situations in which beneficiaries use Medicaid cards
instead of their Medicare identifications when receiving
services, forcing states to pay the provider and then seek Medicaid managed
reimbursement from Medicare.
need to enter the

care plans may
SNP market in
order to hold on to their share of
dual eligible enrollees.

Limited contracts with SNPs for certain services will be
of interest to some states. For example, states may contract with SNPs for care coordination after hospitalization or to wrap around the Medicare prescription drug benefit and gather
drug utilization data. States often cite the need for drug utilization data
as important to their ability to coordinate care.

Institutional SNPs may be viewed by states as an opportunity to explore captitated long-term care arrangements. Because state Medicaid
programs have significant long-term care expenses, they may have a
compelling interest in managing the nursing facility costs for dual eligibles (see Figure 1). Institutional SNPs could help states manage such
expenses by specializing in, for example, PACE-type models. On the
other hand, long-term care services are currently carved out of most
Medicaid managed care programs. States, therefore, may not be interested in pursuing such arrangements with institutional SNPs.
Current Medicaid managed care plans face fewer start-up challenges than
others now applying for MA contracts, and they may need to participate
in the SNP market in order to hold on to their share of dual eligible enrollees. In fact, such plans may even have a marketing advantage. CMS is
allowing a one-time option for dual eligible SNPs that have a current
Medicaid managed care contract to passively enroll their current Medicaid plan members, who have previously been in Medicare FFS, into the
MA SNP. (The beneficiary will have an opportunity to opt out of being
enrolled in the SNP.) Only dual eligible SNPs can passively enroll Medicaid managed care beneficiaries, and SNPs cannot passively enroll individuals who are already enrolled in another MA plan. On October 1, 2005,
beneficiaries received notice about passive enrollment and had until October 31, 2005 to opt out of the process. SNPs must notify passive enrollees of their SNP enrollment by November 30, 2005.29
As noted earlier, state Medicaid programs have entirely different requirements for managed care plans. Some of these differences are due
to federal or state statutory and regulatory requirements. Others are based
on long-time state practices or administrative arrangements. For those
and other reasons, there will need to be a significant commitment of state
staff and other resources if SNPs are to contract to deliver Medicaid services along with the Medicare services.
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Coordination between MA SNPs and states is viewed by many as critical for the success of SNPs as integrated care plans. CMS stresses coordination with state Medicaid programs in their MA SNP guidance and
regulations, but CMS cannot mandate this relationship. It is likely that
state interest in coordinating with SNPs will vary and will depend on a
number of factors, particularly the level of existing managed care activity within the state. At this point, dual eligible enrollment in Medicaid
managed care is concentrated in a fraction of the states. About 80 percent of dual eligible enrollment is concentrated in ten states.30 Also, over
90 percent of Medicaid managed care dual eligibles are enrolled in plans
that serve other populations. Only a handful of Medicare managed care
programs exclusively serve certain segments of the Medicaid population, such as beneficiaries eligible for nursing home care or supplemental security income (SSI).31 Tennessee, California, Oregon,
and Arizona are among the states with large numbers of CMS stresses coordination with
dual eligible managed care enrollees, and there is a great state Medicaid programs but
deal of interest in SNPs in these states, as well as in Florida
cannot mandate it.
and Massachusetts.
Provider “buy-in” is critical to making special needs plans work. Serving special needs populations such as chronically ill enrollees and dual
eligibles is different from serving other Medicare beneficiaries or commercial populations, and plans cannot simply overlay the SNP population on a commercial provider network. Access to specialists and other
specific providers will be needed in order to effectively meet the needs
of these populations.
Managed care plans are not required to have contracts with states for
payment of dual eligibles’ Medicare premiums and cost sharing in order
to receive the SNP designation. States are not required to pay premiums
on behalf of dual eligible enrollees who elect Medicare managed care.
Furthermore, states have the option to pay cost sharing for dual eligibles
based on Medicaid provider rates, which may be lower than Medicare
rates. Therefore, SNP providers may not be able to collect the full cost
sharing for dual eligibles. About one-third of state Medicaid programs
currently do not pay the 20 percent Medicare Part B copayment on behalf
of dual eligibles.32 This could affect SNP’s ability to develop an adequate
provider network. Nonpayment of cost sharing can lower provider reimbursement, which may keep providers from joining a SNP network. However, some believe the higher risk-adjusted payment rates may allow plans
to reimburse providers at a level that will compensate for this loss.
In the short run, establishing SNP contracts will not likely be a priority
for many states. The MMA implementation process has generated many
immediate and high-priority demands on states, including managing new
eligibility processes for the Medicare drug benefit, recalculating managed
care and provider rates to remove prescription drug costs, and assessing
state “clawback” requirements.33 However, some argue there are too many
“win scenarios” for states to ignore SNPs for long.
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SNP CHALLENGES
Medicare SNPs face a variety of challenges and uncertainties. First, there
are a significant number of operational issues. Managed care plans seeking to become dually capitated SNPs may face conflicting and duplicative administrative requirements under Medicare managed care and state
and federal Medicaid managed care rules and regulations. Not all Medicaid managed care plans, for example, are licensed by the state to be
risk-bearing entities. In order to be a SNP, plans must meet Medicare
reserve and solvency requirements and be licensed by the state to be a
risk-bearing entity. Conflicts regarding enrollment, member materials,
state licensure, quality assurance provisions, marketing, solvency and
reserve requirements, and appeals processes can potentially lead to inefficient administration for plans and states and confusion for beneficiaries. In addition to meeting different requirements for each program,
there may be requirements specific to SNPs. For example, SNPs serving
dual eligibles are required to meet the same quality and data reporting
requirements as other MA plans. CMS, however, is also exploring special quality measures for the institutional and chronic condition SNPs.34
Although the new risk-adjusted payment formula (which includes the additional amounts for dual eligibles and institutionalized elderly and disabled) may provide financial gains to plans with healthier enrollees such
as MSP beneficiaries, the payments may not be sufficient for SNPs with
high numbers of frail and disabled enrollees without “frailty adjusters.”
According to the General Accounting Office (now called the Government
Accountability Office), “research has shown that while diagnosis-based risk
adjusters improve the overall accuracy of Medicare payments to health
plans, they tend to underestimate the cost for plans concentrating on frail
beneficiaries.”35 CMS stated in its guidance for 2006 that frailty adjusters
will only apply to PACE programs and certain other demonstrations. CMS
is continuing to conduct analyses to determine the feasibility of implementing a frailty adjuster for the MA program. The earliest this would occur is
2007. Competing with other MA plans may be difficult. In order to be competitive, SNPs must be able to offer low-cost plans. It is not yet clear whether
SNPs that have only special needs enrollees can be financially viable.

CONCLUSION
While some plans and states are jumping on the SNP bandwagon immediately, others are taking a “wait and see” approach. For states with dual
eligible managed care programs and/or demonstrations, SNPs provide
new opportunities to better coordinate—even integrate—care in a way
that is logical and relatively easy to implement. For others, observing
how some of the risks and uncertainties play out before deciding whether
to participate in this new market niche may be wise.
Although integrating acute and long-term care services and Medicare
and Medicaid financing may be viewed as an ideal objective of SNPs,
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there are no guarantees. Regardless of how the SNP market evolves, it
is clear that policymakers are committed to the concept of providing
managed care to the frail elderly and disabled and that they support
moving more Medicare beneficiaries into managed care arrangements
over time. The creation of a permanent option for managed care plans to
specialize in care for high-need, high-cost populations is a significant step.
It is a step toward a delivery system that, under ideal circumstances, can
allow the provision of appropriate, cost-effective services along the continuum of care regardless of payer.
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